The development of side-channel and fault injection attacks against the implementation of algorithms used in elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), has pointed out that it is not enough to implement efficient algorithms that are secure from a theoretical point of view. In this sense, it is necessary to design algorithms that do not leak information which could allow an attacker to obtain the used keys, thus making the physical implementations of those algorithms resistent to this kind of attacks. In this work, some of the options to implement the scalar multiplication for elliptic curves are described.
To our colleague and friend Jaime Muñoz Masqué, so that he had something to “think about” and give us ideas for the future, on the occasion of his 65th birthday.
Acknowledgments
This work has been partially supported by project TIN2014-55325-C2-1-R (ProCriCiS), funded by Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Spain.
We thank Jaime Muñoz Masqué for his continuous and challenging ideas to address new research objectives, as well as for all his useful suggestions to overcome so many obstacles.
